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The Benefits of Rights-Based Fishing--Cooperatives in the Pollock Fishery By Dave Fraser The passage of the American Fisheries Act (AFA) in 1998 allowed for the formation of Cooperatives (Co-ops) in the Bering Sea Pollock fishery. Similar to Individual Transferable Quotas in some ways, Co-ops are one form of "rights-based fishing." By ending the "race for fish" Co-ops have:
In most fisheries, the same catch or more could be taken with less capacity. Because the pie is finite in size, the only way to compete is to expend the revenue that the fishery produces to get the biggest possible share as fast as possible. Those who fail to "fish fast," whether because they wish to fish more responsibly or to produce a better quality product, are punished by the rules of the game. The behavior of spending more in the race is rational for a while (until marginal costs are no longer met) from the perspective of individuals but it does not make sense for the entire fishery. Fishers are forced to give more consideration to short term economic losses than to sustaining the fishery resource and long-term economic benefits. In turn fishery managers often yield to the pressure for short-term results, particularly if the scientific information is uncertain. Well-managed fisheries resources could make a bigger addition to the U.S. economy than they do at present in most fisheries. The key to an effective governance system is eliminating the incentives to race for shares of fisheries, which in turn requires the assignment of enforceable rights to shares of fisheries. These rights should be secured in such a way that the benefits to the rights-holders are linked to the productivity and value of the resource. With a right to a share in the fishery, the incentive is to maximize economic benefits by reducing the cost of using one's right and/or by increasing the value of the right by producing a higher quality fish product. Rights that are secure in the long term facilitate the acceptance of short-term sacrifices for long-term gains. While economic benefits could be greatly increased even from the present yields, history has shown that society is reluctant to make major changes until the current situation becomes intolerable. Though transition costs can be formidable, postponing the transition will make the costs even greater. Delay means foregoing benefits and incurring more costs, including stressful controversy. The failure to apply rights-based approaches is often a symptom of not paying enough attention to the transition process and the costs (economic, social, and political) that are encountered in assigning rights. This generalized portrait describes many fisheries around the United States--one of which was the Bering Sea pollock fishery, until the passage of the AFA. While there was broad recognition that the "race for fish" had to be ended, the system was bogged down with allocation battles. Ending the "race for fish" can best be achieved though the assignment of shares. In order to be effective, the sum of all of the shares must not result in overfishing. The rights- holder need not necessarily be an individual (a person or corporation), it can be a community, collective, or nominated representatives of a group. However, communities or other groupings must be cohesive enough, or have internal governance mechanisms, to prevent individuals within the community from racing among themselves for the community's share. The type of entities assigned rights is important in determining the rights' effectiveness in ending the race for the fish. The AFA vested these rights at the community level, in two types of communities--geographic communities in the western Alaska Community Development Quota program, and "virtual communities" made up of the owners of fishing operations in various sectors of the pollock fishery, who have in turn formed the pollock Co-ops. These communities then take responsibility for further allocation and monitoring of the use of the resource. Peer monitoring has become important in controlling the fishery. One of the goals of a rights-based fishery management system is to cope with the ill effects of over-capacity in fisheries. Allowing a measure of transferability is necessary to maximize the economic benefits of a rights-based fishery regime. Under the new system, therefore, employment and capital deployed in the fishery should decrease. The economic and social costs of the transition to rights-based management must be recognized and paid for, in ways acceptable to those affected. Monetary costs can fairly readily be calculated, but the social costs are harder to assess. Those who benefit in the long term should pay the transition costs. This usually requires that rights are transferable, so that those leaving the fishery may sell their shares to those who stay. Realistically, there is no option but for the people involved with fisheries to pay the social costs of change. By ending the "race for fish" Co-ops have: Increased Value: By allowing fishers to take the time both to fish selectively for higher value fish, and to spend the time to increase recoveries and produce more desirable products based on consumer demand rather than on the constraints of time. Decreased Bycatch: By raising the level of observer coverage, nearly every haul is reported to an industry-funded monitoring agent, who provides real time feedback to skippers. Bycatch "hotspot" problems can be addressed in a timely fashion, and the lost fishing time to avoid bycatch doesn't result in lost production. Allowed for Orderly De-capitalization: The cost of removing excess capacity has been equitably distributed among those who chose to remain in the fishery. Provided Industry-Funded Co-management: Co-ops shift some of the cost of monitoring and enforcement to the fleet that finds it to its benefit to pay for the formalized peer pressure that is part of the Sea State monitoring program. Achieved Equitable Allocation: Co-ops have the advantage of accomplishing allocation through a consensus process through which every member of the co-op decides they are better off within the Co-op than in a "race for fish." Increased Safety: By removing the threat that lost time is lost fish it is possible to slow down or stop when bad weather makes fishing dangerous. Improved Job Quality: While the total number of jobs has been reduced under Co-ops, the jobs that remain are more secure, and more likely to provide full time employment. Dave Fraser is captain of the F/V Muir Milach, president of High Seas Catchers' Co-op, and a long time Advisory Panel member for the North Pacific Fisheries Management Council (NPFMC). He has fished for groundfish in the North Pacific since 1981. He has served on the NPFMC Future of Groundfish Committee, the NMFS advisory panel to the National Academy of Science IFQ review panel that wrote "Sharing the Fish," and on the World Humanities Action Trust's Commission on Fisheries Resources. Additional information: |