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Some Greenpeace Views on ITQs
By Mike Hagler


One of the central concerns facing most fisheries today is the need to permanently remove from the seas a substantial number of fishing vessels so that a balance, or steady-state, can be reached between the need for economic viability and sustainability of fishing communities and the maintenance of ecologically stable, healthy, and productive ocean ecosystems.

Can such an "eco-balance" be achieved through a fisheries management regime based on Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs)? Can ITQs ensure the conservation of healthy and abundant fish stocks, and minimize the risks to marine wildlife populations and the marine environment caused by fishing operations? Greenpeace believes not.

Indeed the ITQ system poses a new, high-risk management regime that can create new and formidable barriers to the realization of sustainable fishing, prosperous fishing communities, and healthy marine ecosystems. It certainly provides no guarantees that fishing effort will not appreciably alter the ecological dynamics of the marine ecosystems in which fishing takes place.

Indeed, evidence in countries where ITQs have been in effect for some years, such as New Zealand (14 years), shows that while the ITQ system initially eliminated from the fishery many fishers operating small-scale fishing vessels, it has been modern and vastly larger mid- and deep-water trawlers, industrial type longliners, and the like, with greater fishing power and efficiency, that replaced them. Small operators may have disappeared, but fishing power has increased dramatically. Along with increased fishing power and efficiency have come increased risks to many of the most valuable of the commercially- targeted fish stocks, to other populations of marine species (for example, seabirds and sharks) that are incidentally captured in fishing operations, and to the integrity of New Zealand's marine environment.

While ITQ advocates hold up the New Zealand management scheme as the "best fisheries management system in the world" because of ITQs, there is not a lot of hard evidence to support the claim. While a few ITQ-managed species in New Zealand waters might appear superficially to be "healthy," that perception is based on the theoretical fisheries management concept of Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY)--a thoroughly discredited fisheries management regime based on statistical modeling, which has proven to be a dismal failure in terms of sustaining marine ecosystem integrity and maintaining fish stocks at high levels of abundance.

Under New Zealand's ITQ system, several commercially important fish stocks remain well below the population size capable of producing a maximum sustainable yield. In an even larger number of cases, New Zealand scientists simply don't know what the status of the stock is. As of the late 1990s there were still no stock estimates for 55 percent of the New Zealand fish stocks managed under ITQs. Most of the remaining 45 percent for which there were estimates have great uncertainties in sustainable catch estimates.

Even less is understood about the impacts that ITQ-managed fishing in New Zealand is having on the ecological relationships between populations of harvested fish species and other marine species that are inter-dependent and related within the fished ecosystem. As in the United States, fishing in New Zealand is conducted within highly complex marine ecosystems, with many multi-species fisheries. The models that New Zealand fisheries managers use, however, still treat species in isolation from the ecosystem as a whole. A parallel problem concerns the effects various fishing practices and gear are having on the diversity, structure, and productivity of New Zealand's marine populations and their environments; for example the impact of bottom trawling on benthic, or bottom-dwelling, marine communities. Clearly, all fishing gears and practices are not equal when it comes to their impact on the marine environment and the species that inhabit it, including the non-target fish stocks that end up as discarded bycatch, and numerous species of animals that are incidentally captured in fishing operations such as seabirds, marine mammals, and sharks.

Under an ITQ management system, if a fisher uses methods or gear types that are more environmentally friendly, but less economically efficient in comparison to other methods or gear, he will eventually reach the position of having to sell off his quota to those who are better at making more money, but potentially worse when it comes to operating in an environmentally-friendly manner.

In the final analysis, Greenpeace believes that ITQs do nothing to promote a precautionary, ecosystem-based approach to fishing. Indeed, in many respects, ITQs further the existing, and wholly inadequate, single-species MSY management paradigm that values only the most commercially-exploited species discounting broader ecosystem impacts.

Fundamentally, Greenpeace does not support the privatization of access to public trust resources. Neither do we accept the premise that only through ownership can stewardship be achieved.

Furthermore, when access to natural resources is privatized, the public's avenues for input and involvement in the conservation of what were once public trust resources become severely constricted. Greenpeace is very concerned that if ITQs are implemented it is likely that any proposal for conservation or protection measures, or other forms of restriction will be vigorously opposed by the new "proprietors" of the resource claiming "ownership" over their "assets."

The two basic criteria for private property are permanent title and the ability to buy and sell it. If these properties exist, then the owner may be entitled to pursue compensation in court if any attempt is made to reduce the value of the property. The grounds for such a suit would be as a "taking" under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. Since many claims could easily be in the millions of dollars, it is unlikely that the federal government would risk making itself vulnerable to these challenges. Rather, it is probable that the government would forego imposing any measures that could be construed as devaluing ITQ shares and, instead, decide to sacrifice the fish stocks, other marine species, and the integrity of the marine ecosystem.

For more information concerning measures that Greenpeace advocates to reach the goal of sustainable fisheries see Greenpeace Principles for Ecologically Responsible Low-Impact Fisheries.

Mike Hagler has been an oceans campaigner with Greenpeace International since 1989, based in Auckland, New Zealand, working on fisheries and aquaculture issues. He is presently working in Washington, DC as the oceans campaign coordinator for Greenpeace USA.

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