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Transferable Fishing Rights Are Best for Fish and Fishermen By Richard B. Allen ITQs and ITTs Ideal for Lobsters There is now sufficient experience around the world with Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) and similar systems of transferable fishing rights (transferable trap certificates or other effort units) to demonstrate their superior effectiveness in conserving fishery resources and improving the economic productivity of fisheries.1 Lobsters are an ideal species for ITQ management, and ITQ management would be ideal for the lobster fishery. But ITQs are too much of an ideological leap for the New England lobster fishery. Transferable trap allocations (individual transferable traps or ITTs) are clearly the next best alternative and some states are already making moves in that direction. Florida has had a transferable trap certificate program in place since 1991 in its spiny lobster fishery, and the success of that program is starting to get attention in the northern lobster states. Transferable trap certificates are identical in principle to ITQs and they even have some advantages over ITQs. The Western Australian lobster fishery is the first fishery in the world to be certified as a sustainable fishery by the Marine Stewardship Council and has had a transferable trap certificate program in place for more than 30 years.2 Most of the other Australian states have a similar long history of transferable trap management and some have moved to ITQs. Having gotten over the hurdle of limiting licenses and establishing trap limits, the Atlantic coast lobster fishery (its most valuable) must now figure out how to let new blood into the fishery, how to maintain the diversity that has characterized the fishery, how to let young people grow their fishing businesses as their needs and ambition dictate, and how to reduce total fishing effort while allowing individuals to run profitable, efficient operations. ITQs and transferable trap allocations do all of those things. Little Evidence that ITQs Eliminate Smaller Vessels But the fatal flaw in ITQs from the New England perspective is a fear that ITQs "could be acquired by large commercial interests that would squeeze out smaller independent fishermen."3 The evidence from ITQ fisheries around the world does not support this fear.4 Certainly, ITQ fisheries have resulted in reductions in fishing effort this is to be expected if excess fishing effort is the fundamental problem. But "there is little evidence (from a review of 100 fishery management programs around the world) that smaller vessels are eliminated when individual transferable quotas are introduced."5 Fewer boats, less labor, and higher profits for those remaining in the fishery are the same results that one would have hoped to see from the taxpayer-funded groundfish buy-out program that was supported by Senator Snowe and many of the same constituents who oppose ITQs. Whether ITQs would make a fishery more attractive to large commercial interests is an open question. But the fishery management councils can clearly design ITQ systems to avoid the domination of large commercial interests. The North Pacific halibut and sablefish ITQ program provides a good example of the kind of social engineering that should allay Senator Snowe's fears. And large commercial interests don't need ITQs to dominate a fishery. The history of the Maine and New England offshore groundfish fishery demonstrates that it was primarily a company-owned fleet for most of its history. If large companies are going to take a renewed interest in the New England fisheries, or if successful fishermen are going to grow into large commercial interests (that means bigger than I am) they need only buy the federal limited access permits that are necessary to participate in most of our major fisheries. Efficiency Beats Costly Regulations ITQs will improve the efficiency of the fishing industry, and Senator Snowe and her constituents express a valid concern about the impact that will have on Maine's coastal communities. Any effective fishery management system will reduce fishing effort because excess fishing effort is the root cause of fishery depletion. What most people don't realize, however, is that improvements in productivity and efficiency serve to stimulate economic development and job creation. Our nation's economic boom is testament to that. It is easy to demonstrate that efficiently managed fisheries can have the same effect.6 Traditional forms of fishery management (closed areas, closed seasons, size limits, trip limits, crew limits, gear limitations) increase the cost to harvest fish in the expectation that it will be too expensive to catch too much fish using the legal fishing strategy.7 In terms of achieving the "greatest overall benefits to the nation from our fishery resources"8 this is a counterproductive approach. Society obtains its benefits from the resource through the profits that are generated by the fishery. Regulations that increase the cost to harvest fish also reduce fishing profits and the benefits that society receives from the resource. In contrast to traditional regulations, ITQs conserve fish while increasing profits and societal benefits. Leadership Wed to Failed Philosophy Despite the success of ITQ fisheries around the world, and despite the horrific failures of traditional management, New England maintains a strong resistance to ITQ management. But more and more New England fishermen are recognizing the advantages of ITQs and ITTs. Sadly, and perhaps tragically, their leadership is repeating the same scenario that we saw with limited entry and Maine's lobster zones. In that case, the spokespersons for Maine's fisheries were telling the world that limited entry was "un-Maine" at the same time that most of Maine's lobster zone councils were voting to limit entry. The opponents of ITQs do a disservice to their constituents and to the nation. Without transferable fishing rights, fishermen and fishing families are condemned to ever-increasing restrictions that limit their ability to grow a profitable fishing business. More and more, as a recent editorial in National Fisherman magazine laments, our once proud fishing industry is relegated to the position of a supplicant at the public trough, giving the taxpayers "the impression that we've caught all the fish and now we're putting the bite on them."9 ITQs provide a mechanism through which the fishing industry can regain its freedom, its independence, and its pride as a true contributor to the economic well-being of society. Dick Allen operates the inshore lobster fishing boat "Ocean Pearl" from the port of Pt. Judith, RI. After 20 years of opposition to limited entry in all forms, he became an advocate of ITQs in the late 1980s, after a thorough study of the alternatives.
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